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The Magic Circle 
Joshua A.T. Fairfield* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the concept of the “magic circle,” the 
metaphorical barrier that supposedly excludes real-world law from 
virtual worlds.  The Article argues that this metaphor fails because 
there is no “real” world as distinguished from “virtual” worlds.  Instead 
of a magic circle, this Article advocates a rule of consent: actions in a 
virtual world give rise to legal liability if they exceed the scope of 
consent given by other players within the game.  The Article concludes 
that although real-world law cannot reasonably be excluded from 
virtual worlds, game gods and players can control the interface 
between law and virtual worlds through their agreements, customs, 
and practices.  This leads to a new conception of the magic circle: the 
point of interface between community-generated norms and 
background law, which often adopts local norms as legal rules. 
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Recently, a Dutch court found two young boys guilty of theft of 
virtual property after they threatened a classmate with a knife until 
he agreed to transfer virtual items to their accounts in the online 
game Runescape.1  Commenting on the case, legal scholar Eugene 
Volokh stated, 
[T]he theft may have been of virtual goods, but it was accomplished through 
physical violence in the real world, and against a real person, not an avatar.  It’s 
clearly proper to prosecute the physical attack and the threats; and I think it’s 
sensible to prosecute it as theft as well, since the defendants did take from the 
victim something they had no right to take, using violence in the real world.  I’d 
call this “real-world theft of virtual goods,” not “virtual theft.” 
I continue to think that generally speaking the law shouldn’t prohibit purely in-
game “theft,” “murder,” “rape,” and so on.  But outside-game violence (or even in-
game threats of outside-game violence) [is] the proper subject of the criminal law, 
including when the violence or threats coerce action or transfer of valuable objects 
within the game.2 
The difficulty of maintaining any bright line between “in-game” 
and “outside-game” acts was demonstrated two days later.  A Tokyo 
woman, angered when her virtual romance in the world of MapleStory 
ended in virtual divorce, logged on to her erstwhile virtual husband’s 
account and deleted his avatar.3  He complained to the police, and as 
of this writing, she is in police custody.4  The action was virtual, and 
the harmed avatar was virtual—but the act had legal repercussions in 
the real world. 
I do not intend to single out Volokh—I wrote most of this 
Article before he made the comments above.  However, his statement 
provides an excellent example of the persistence of a legal metaphor, 
generally termed the “magic circle,” which has dogged our ability to 
understand how the law impacts virtual-world communities.  The 
magic circle is the supposed metaphorical line between the fantasy 
realms of virtual worlds and what we consider to be the real world.5  
The purpose of the magic circle is to protect virtual worlds from 
outside influences—law, real-world economics, real-world money, and 
 1. See Jacqueline Carver, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE, Oct. 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/region /netherlands/081022-virtual-theft-is-
real. 
 2. See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, Dutch Youths 
Convicted of Virtual Theft, available at http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_10_19-
2008_10_25.shtml#1224695366 (Oct. 22, 2008, 13:09 EST). 
 3. See Mike Musgrove, Tokyo Woman Jailed for Avatar “Murder,” WASH. POST, 
Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2008/10/ 
tokyo_woman_jailed_for_avatar.html?nav=rss_blog. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 200-05 
(2004) (describing the concept of the magic circle). 
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the like.  The thrust of the magic circle metaphor is that actions that 
occur within virtual worlds are not real, and thus cannot be 
sanctioned using real-world law.6  Following this reasoning, real-world 
law is appropriately left out of virtual worlds. 
This Article seeks to debunk the magic circle.  The thrust of my 
argument is simple: There is no “real” world as distinguished from 
“virtual” worlds.  Rather, all supposedly “virtual” actions originate 
with real people, and impact real people, albeit through a computer-
mediated environment.7  As a result, the distinction between a 
“virtual” act and a “real” one is not helpful.  This Article advocates 
replacing the magic circle with a rule of consent.  What matters is 
whether the action taken—be it a bite in a boxing match, a blow to the 
head in football, or a theft of virtual property—is within the scope of 
consent of the other players.8 
Part I of this Article will examine the concept of the magic 
circle and the reasons it has gained traction within online 
communities.  Part II will discuss the reaction of the legal community 
to prior claims of legal separatism by online communities, including 
the Internet cybersovereignty debates of the 1990s.  Part III will 
develop a framework for future interactions between real-world law 
and online communities.  This new model will not depend on claims of 
online sovereignty or on claims that what happens in virtual worlds is 
not “real” but will instead build on an analysis of legal consent, 
community self-regulation, and legal recognition of community norms.  
Finally, the Article will draw a new magic circle: instead of arguing 
that the law cannot touch virtual worlds, this Article will argue that 
virtual worlds may be able to generate community norms usable by 
real-world courts as a source of legal rules. 
I. FANTASY, PLAY, AND THE MAGIC CIRCLE 
Before evaluating the magic circle as a legal metaphor, it is 
useful to understand why the metaphor has proven so durable in 
virtual worlds.  This section discusses some of the reasons why the 
 6. Id. at 201-02. 
 7. See EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE 
OF ONLINE GAMES 159 (2005) (“[W]here exactly is the line between game and life? . . . 
Imagine if someone were to insist on the following rule: if a rabbit attacks [a player] and I 
help him by casting a spell, we are ‘in the game,’ but if we are not actually interacting with 
the synthetic world, but rather only with each other, then we are ‘in life.’ . . . Our culture 
has moved beyond the point where such distinctions are helpful.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979) 
(establishing the traditional rule that intentional violence outside of the scope of consent is 
an actionable tort). 
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magic circle metaphor has gained recognition and respect within the 
virtual-world community. 
Protecting virtual play is the first function of the magic circle.9  
When people play, they often act out scenarios that would be illegal if 
performed in the real world.10  In video games, for example, players 
might kill each others’ avatars.  An actual murder charge will not be 
brought when one avatar kills another within a game dedicated to 
such mayhem.  This makes sense: children often play games (for 
example, cowboys and indians) that represent real-world tragedy, but 
if society were to prosecute children simply because of the subject 
matter of their games, they would stop.11  The play is not “real,” 
proponents of the magic circle argue, and thus law does not regulate 
it.  However, there is a problem.  As discussed below, if a player 
departs from the rules of the game and injury results, the law may 
intervene.12 
The second function of the magic circle is to protect stories and 
speech.13  In virtual worlds, players telling fantasy stories can act 
them out without repercussions like actors on a stage.  Just as in the 
theatre, some stories cannot be told without discussing violence or 
sexuality.  In works of fiction, characters commonly engage in illegal 
acts.  Likewise, movies or theatre productions sometimes include 
depictions of sex or violence that may fall outside the realm of social 
and legal acceptability.  Yet the authors of those plays, books, or 
movies are not themselves liable for the illegal actions of their 
characters.  Indeed, the artistic expression of acts that would be 
against the law if actually performed is protected by the First 
Amendment.14  There are books about murders, but no one advocates 
prosecuting these authors for murder.  As part of our conception of 
what it means to be human, we value the ability to tell stories about 
the worst acts of humankind without fear of prosecution.  Tales about 
sex and violence have traditionally been protected by our free-speech 
 9. See, e.g., Castronova, supra note 5, at 188 (“For Huizinga, nothing can be a 
game if it involves moral consequence. Whatever is happening, if it really matters in an 
ethical or moral sense, cannot be a game.”) (discussing JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A 
STUDY IN THE PLAY-ELEMENTS IN CULTURE (1938)). 
 10. In the controversial Grand Theft Auto series, for example, players are allowed—
even encouraged—to run over pedestrians and beat up prostitutes in addition to the game’s 
namesake crime of stealing cars. 
 11. See Castronova, supra note 5, at 188. 
 12. See, e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 13. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (holding the Child Online 
Protection Act unconstitutional for burdening adult access to protected speech). 
 14. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down a 
ban on the virtual depiction of child pornography as violative of the First Amendment). 
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jurisprudence even though those actions, if actually performed, are 
not.15 
The third major function of the magic circle is to protect what 
is known as a “start over,” a “level playing field,” or a “clean slate.”16  
There is a media-influenced perception17 that some players of virtual 
worlds are not successful in the real world, and thus deeply desire a 
new life in a new world.  Therefore, it is important to some players 
that they get an even playing field to begin their virtual lives anew.  
Even if one rejects the standard media characterization of gamers as 
young or losers (and I think we must, since studies show that gamers 
are older and more successful than most had assumed),18 the level 
playing field remains an important concept in virtual play.19  Nobody 
wants to play a game in which the results are skewed in favor of one’s 
opponent from the very beginning. 
Thus, the basic conception of the magic circle within the 
virtual-world community includes the following elements: protection of 
spaces for play, tools for narrative, and the chance to build a new life.  
Note that this Article does not take issue with these goals, but rather 
the accuracy and efficacy of the legal metaphor currently advanced to 
achieve them.  As detailed below, virtual communities do not gain any 
protection by claiming that their actions are not “real” and thus not 
subject to legal sanctions. 
 15. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (holding that a book 
describing the life of a prostitute is not constitutionally obscene.); see also Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (plurality opinion) (“[M]aterial dealing with sex in a manner 
that advocates ideas or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of 
social importance, may not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional 
protection.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 16. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Worlds: A Primer, in THE 
STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 13, 15 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone 
Noveck eds., 2006); see also Posting of Elizabeth Harper to WoW Insider, 
http://www.wowinsider.com/ (Feb. 20, 2008) (“We've taken the approach that we want 
players to feel like it's a level playing field once they're in [World of Warcraft]. Outside 
resources don't play into it—no gold buying, etc.”). 
 17. See South Park: Make Love, Not Warcraft (Comedy Central Network television 
broadcast Oct. 4, 2006) (making fun of one particular World of Warcraft player who had no 
life and became too powerful, even for the game gods). 
 18. See, e.g., The Entertainment Software Association – Industry Facts, 
http://www.theesa.com/facts/index.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) (reporting that 26 
percent of Americans over the age of 50 play video games and the average age of a gamer is 
35). 
 19. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 16, at 22 (explaining that every EverQuest 
player begins at the relatively weak “Level 1” and must level up to play most of the game). 
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II. CYBERSOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAGIC CIRCLE 
A second conception of the magic circle is advanced by lawyers 
and academics rather than players.  Claims that the magic circle 
protects virtual worlds from the incursions of real-world law mirror 
the claims of cyberseparatism that were advanced in the mid-1990s.  
The core of the cybersovereignty debate was the tension between 
cyberseparatist assertions that cyberspace was immune to regulation 
by real-world governments due to conflicts between sovereigns,20 and 
cybernationalist claims that national sovereigns could regulate online 
communities without any special need for new jurisprudential tools.21  
This section examines the literature of cybersovereignty, asserts that 
apologists from both sides have failed to capture the essentials, and 
proposes a better framework for understanding the reasonable and 
desirable relationship between law and virtual worlds. 
Legal academics interested in cyber-regulation began by 
arguing about whether or not governments could enforce their laws 
across borders.  David Post’s “Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace” argued that the problems inherent in extraterritorial 
enforcement of national laws were such that governments could not 
regulate internationally.22  Jack Goldsmith’s “Against Cyberanarchy” 
responded with some vim that cross-border law enforcement was no 
more difficult in the age of the Internet than under prior 
telecommunications regimes, and that nation-states were perfectly 
capable of unilateral regulation of online communities.23  Goldsmith’s 
later work cataloged the fragmentation of the Internet into nation-
state intranets (such as China’s largely separated space) and argued 
that the nationalization of cyberspace was largely inevitable and 
desirable.24 
Cyberseparatists and their cybernationalist interlocutors have 
largely talked past one another.  Cyberseparatist arguments are 
 20. See, e.g., Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the 
World of Internet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 605, 618 (2003) (summarizing the 
cyberseparatist doctrine as wanting to protect cyberspace from social norms and 
governance). 
 21. See id. at 613 (“Traditionalists do not respond to this extreme portrayal of 
unfettered regulatory overlap in cyberspace by denying the theoretical problem of 
regulatory spillover effects.”). 
 22. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Laws and Borders – The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). 
 23. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998). 
 24. See Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, Digital Borders, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-  
Feb. 2006, at 40, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-
2006/feature_goldsmith_janfeb06.msp. 
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largely normative and cybernationalist arguments are, for the most 
part, descriptive.  Cyberseparatists deny the power of governments to 
make law that affects online spaces25 while cybernationalists 
inadequately address the negative consequences of national regulation 
of online communities.26  Yet nation-states do affect online spaces 
through the enforcement of laws that impact their citizens.27  This is 
certainly true of virtual worlds, because such worlds tend to be largely 
congruent with national borders.  Even transnational phenomena, 
such as World of Warcraft, tend to be subject to national governance 
because servers are typically located in or near the countries of the 
majority of players.28 
On the other hand, cyberseparatists note, with some 
legitimacy, that national power is at its lowest ebb when it attempts to 
regulate fantasy games, both because games have traditionally 
enjoyed some self-regulatory deference from courts, and because 
exercises of creativity and imagination ought to be freed from 
government oversight.29  Thus, cybernationalists argue that nation-
states can indeed regulate virtual worlds because servers and citizens 
are close at hand while cyberseparatists argue that nation-states 
should not interfere with virtual worlds because such worlds are 
largely fantasy. 
As the debate stands, cybernationalists have largely carried 
the day on descriptive grounds, but they have failed to provide much 
of a normative basis for their theories.  Governments can clearly affect 
online communities by passing and enforcing applicable laws—but 
cybernationalists have not demonstrated that such laws will be better 
or more effective than the customs and norms already in use within 
online populations. 
This Article argues that the debate is at a standstill today 
largely because the parties began with the wrong question.  
Sovereignty debates are, at best, tangential to cyber-regulation.  The 
 25. See Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 20, at 612. 
 26. See id at 613 n. 35; see also Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 1201 (“It does not 
argue that cyberspace regulation is a good idea, and it does not take a position on the 
merits of particular regulations beyond their jurisdictional legitimacy.”). 
 27. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF 
A BORDERLESS WORLD 65-85 (2006). 
 28. World of Warcraft, for example, has servers located in the United States, 
Europe, and China. For a listing of current server locations, compiled by the gaming 
community, see Realms List-WoWWiki, http://www.wowwiki.com/Realms_list (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2009). 
 29. See, e.g., F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crimes, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 293, 294 n.5 (2004) (“[T]alk of a thick cyberspace sovereignty is really convincing only 
when talking about MUDs, videogames, and other exercises of fantasy . . . .” (quoting Tim 
Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1199-1202)). 
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fundamental issue of online regulation is not the balance of power 
between nation-state sovereigns.30  Rather, it is the balance between 
sovereign and citizens.  Governments must decide how much 
regulation of citizens’ online activities is appropriate and effective and 
citizens must decide how much government interference they will 
tolerate. 
The focus on nation-state sovereignty has caused academics to 
overlook other more promising solutions.  Online communities do not 
need sovereignty in order to benefit from some degree of self-rule.  
Many groups are able to gain some access to legal rules, and to court 
enforcement of those rules, without benefit of separate legal 
sovereignty.31  For example, industry customs and practices often 
create default legal rules that courts draw upon in regulating those 
industries.32  Through the law of contract, private agreements can 
have the force of law.33  The regular course of a business often sets a 
legal standard.34  Even the rules of a game can have the force of law: 
bite your opponent in a boxing match or cheat in a Las Vegas poker 
game and legal consequences will follow.35  Punch someone in a boxing 
match, or bluff in a poker game, and all is well. 
 30. See Doreen Carvajal, French Court Tells eBay to Pay for Counterfeits, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01 
/technology/01ebay.html. 
 31. See Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private 
Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 203, 
243 (2007) (“Traditional dichotomies between hard and soft law, informal and formal, 
public and private, and even law and non-law begin to break down leading to a form of 
legal hybridity. Law-making and enforcement are created by a diverse range of private and 
public actors including governments, NGOs, corporations, and private regulatory bodies 
that sometimes work together to formulate policies and regulate themselves, and each 
other, both within and without the framework of the state.”) (emphasis in original). 
 32. See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(applying the knockout rule such that “[t]he ultimate contract . . . includes those non-
conflicting terms and any other terms supplied by the [Uniform Commercial Code], 
including terms incorporated by course of performance (§ 2-208), course of dealing (§ 1-
205), usage of trade (§ 1-205), and other ‘gap fillers’ or ‘off-the-rack’ terms”). 
 33. Although the use of contracts to create mass public rules does have limits, see 
generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of 
Virtual Worlds, 54 MCGILL L. J. 427 (2008). 
 34. See L & A Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs., Inc., 17 F.3d 106 (5th Cir. 
1994) (supplanting a contract term definition with the common industry definition); see 
also Stender v. Twin City Foods, Inc., 510 P.2d 221, 225 (Wash. 1973) (“The definition . . . 
must be determined in light of reasonable industry custom and usage . . . even though 
words in their ordinary or legal meaning are unambiguous.”). 
 35. Boxer Mike Tyson, for example, lost his boxing license, was fined $3 million, 
and was ordered to pay legal costs after biting off a portion of Evander Holyfield’s ear in a 
1997 fight. See Mike Downey, Commission Didn’t Pull Any Punches, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 
1997, at C1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1997/jul/10/sports/sp-11287. 
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Legal commentators have overlooked a lot of this kind of 
community-based law because of the misplaced focus on sovereignty.  
In an effort to correct this oversight, the remainder of this Article 
examines community norms and player consent in virtual worlds as a 
potential source for real-world legal rules for virtual worlds. 
III. DRAWING A NEW MAGIC CIRCLE 
For players who wish to see online communities set their own 
rules, all is not lost.  It seems unlikely that real-world nations will 
recognize online communities as separate and coequal sovereigns.  But 
it is likely that real-world courts will seriously consider the norms 
generated by online communities as courts take up the task of 
applying law to virtual worlds.  This section discusses several ways in 
which the rules generated by online communities might gain legal 
force and effect.  The section argues that the relevant inquiry is not 
whether actions are “real” or “virtual,” but whether a given action falls 
outside the parties’ scope of consent. 
A. The Rules of the Game 
Game rules are created by the intersection of at least four legal 
sources: contractual end-user license agreements (EULAs) drafted by 
game gods (the companies that create and maintain virtual worlds), 
community-negotiated norms, player consent, and background laws.  
Since consent in both the contract and torts sense is a core concept in 
determining how these sources combine to create law, this section will 
discuss consent in games in detail. 
When a player consents to a game by clicking through a 
contract, she agrees to a package of contract terms whether or not she 
is familiar with each one.36  Although these terms may be in the form 
of rules, they are in fact contractual promises, made by the player to 
the game god.  In addition, players agree to conform their actions to a 
common set of expectations in the torts sense; these expectations can 
be formally generated (as in the Monopoly ruleset) or informally 
generated (as in a game of touch football).37  Actions outside the rules 
 36. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–02 
(1941) (describing role of contract doctrine in informing parties that they are about to 
undertake binding legal relations). 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 cmt. b, illus. 5 (1965) (illustrating that 
even breaches of the rules of the game—such as an offside tackle—are still within the scope 
of consent of the game); see also, e.g., McAdams v. Windham, 94 So. 742 (Ala. 1922) 
(boxing); Gibeline v. Smith, 80 S.W. 961 (Mo. Ct. App. 1904) (tussling); Vendrell v. Sch. 
Dist. No. 26C, Malheur County, 376 P.2d 406 (Or. 1962) (football tackle). 
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and also outside the scope of player agreement thus run the risk of 
being sanctioned by background law.38 
One caveat in defining consent: I have previously written about 
why the model of informed consumer consent to individual contract 
terms is not useful in mass-market transactions.39  Consumers 
understandably do not read contracts and the cost of conveying a 
specific piece of information through the terms of a contract is often 
greater than the benefits that the information conveys.40  Thus, when 
this Article discusses contractual consent, it refers to blanket consent 
to EULA terms as a package rather than informed consent to each 
term. 
Further, the consent discussed here has a broader meaning 
than purely contractual consent.  Some claims sound in contract; 
others sound in tort.  In the tort formulation, when one plays a game, 
one agrees to the rules established by the game community, not just 
the rules written by the game manufacturer.  Monopoly may not be 
intended as a drinking game, but with a few tweaks of the rules by the 
community it can become one; the scope of consent given by the player 
changes to match the variant of game negotiated by the community.  
Football may be tackle, flag, or touch, depending on the decision of the 
community, and the scope of player consent varies accordingly. 
Unlike contractual notions of consent, in the tort formulation a 
breach of game rules may still be within the players’ consent to the 
game. 41  A football tackle that is offside is against the rules, but it is 
within the scope of the expected behavior in the game.  As such, injury 
resulting from a tackle that is only improper because it is offsides is 
not actionable.42  There is a spectrum of allowable behavior: if 
something is technically outside the rules but within the scope of 
consent, then it will not yield legal liability. 
Instead of asking what is “real” or “virtual,” lawyers examining 
actions related to virtual worlds should ask who has agreed to what 
 38. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 39. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the 
Law of Contract, __ EMORY L.J. __ (forthcoming 2009). 
 40. Id. 
 41. The closest contract analogy might be waiver or modification. If party A violates 
a contract term, and party B takes no action the first several times, there is an argument 
that B has agreed to change the parties’ agreement. 
 42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 cmt. b, illus. 5 (1965) (“A, a member 
of a football team, tackles B, an opposing player, while he, A, is "offside." The tackle is 
made with no greater violence than would be permissible by the rules and usages of 
football were he "onside." A has not subjected B to a violence greater than, or different 
from, that permitted by the rules, although he is guilty of a breach of a rule. A is not liable 
to B.”). 
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and with whom.  In a legal conflict between player and game god, the 
contractual EULA provisions might well prevail.43  For example, 
suppose that a player used off-color chat in a public chat channel in 
“The Barrens,” an area within the virtual world World of Warcraft 
that is well known for rough-and-tumble language.  In a player/game-
god dispute, a court might decide that the game god was well within 
its contractual rights to ban the player from the game. 
However, if player A sued player B for off-color chat in the 
Barrens, the court may well turn to community norms instead of the 
EULA.  (It might be especially likely to do so if it determined that the 
EULA is a promise between each player separately and the game god, 
not between player A and player B.)44  Such a court might decide that 
by continuing to listen to Barrens public chat (players have the option 
to mute chat channels if they do not wish to hear them), player A 
consented to a more rough-and-tumble standard of language.  Blue 
chat clearly violates the EULA terms.  But some amount of rule-
breaking is expected in any game and off-color chat is likely included 
within the scope of consent that governs what players may say vis-à-
vis each other.45 
Additionally, players may consent to activities beyond both the 
scope of the EULA and community standards.  For example, EULAs 
forbid hacking into other players’ accounts, and community norms 
agree.46  Thus, hacking another player’s account is likely to sound both 
in contract and in tort (and, for that matter, in criminal law).  In other 
situations, EULAs and community norms may not align.  EULAs 
forbid sharing accounts between players,47 but community norms do 
not agree.  As a result, individual players share account information 
all the time.  If I share my account information with someone else, 
that person is not liable to me for accessing the account, either under 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, for unauthorized access of my 
 43. See, e.g., Complaint, Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. In Game Dollar, LLC, No. 
SACV07-0589 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2007), available at http://virtuallyblind.com/files 
/in_game_dollar_complaint.pdf; see also Consent Order, Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. In Game 
Dollar, LLC, No. SACV07-0589 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2008), available at 
http://virtuallyblind.com/files/Peons_Injunction.pdf (shutting down defendant’s business 
that engaged in systemic EULA violations). 
 44. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of 
Virtual Worlds, 54 MCGILL L. J. 427 (2008). Cf. Michael Risch, Virtual Third Parties, 25 
SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L. J. 415 (2009). 
 45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 cmt. b. 
 46. See World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, § 2(B)-(C), 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/eula.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). 
 47. See id. § 6. 
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system, for conversion, or for any of a number of other common law 
theories.48 
EULAs create game-god/player legal obligations and 
simultaneously propose rules for adoption as community norms.49  
Separating these functions permits us to understand why EULAs 
strongly impact community norms and yet are not the sole source of 
law in virtual worlds.  Instead, EULAs interact with community 
norms, individual consent, and background law to generate legal 
outcomes. 
This analysis opens the door for a new understanding of how 
legal rules operate within virtual worlds.  Whether or not an action in 
a virtual world gives rise to a viable cause of action depends on the 
scope of consent granted between each set of parties.  Rights will 
change depending on the relationship between the parties.  For 
example, the virtual property problem has foundered on the 
assumption that virtual property must be treated the same in the 
relationship between game god and player as it is in the player-player 
relationship.  Many EULAs claim that no player has ownership rights 
in virtual property.50  However, claims between players are still 
adjudicated by courts across the world as if such rights did exist.51  
The state of the law at this moment is, essentially, that virtual 
property rights do not run against game gods but do run against other 
players.  This is not surprising—it is possible to have a contract with 
the game god that does not affect legal rights between one player and 
another.  Under this approach, between game god and player, the 
property will be treated as owned by the game god, but if one player 
steals another player’s virtual property, legal liability will result. 
Under the old conception of the magic circle, such a result 
makes no sense: either virtual property is “virtual,” and interests in it 
are utterly unprotected by law, or it is “real” and fully protected 
against all comers.  Under the new conception articulated by this 
Article, players in virtual worlds are real, the actions are real, and 
even the digital objects of their actions are real.  The critical question 
is not whether the property is real or not, or whether a theft of 
 48. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). Like the common law 
action of trespass, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act requires access of a protected 
computer without authorization in order to give rise to a cause of action; this requirement 
certainly would not be met if I willingly gave account access to a friend. 
 49. Indeed, Second Life has incorporated a “Community Standards” list into its 
Terms of Service. This list, while broad, can be changed at the request of the Second Life 
community. See Second Life Community Standards, http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2009). 
 50. See World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, supra note 46, § 3(A). 
 51. See, e.g., Carver, supra note 1. 
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property is real or virtual, but whether a given act as relates to the 
property is inside or outside the scope of consent of the parties.  As 
between the game god and the player, the EULA may clearly indicate 
that the god may alter or delete a given digital object at will.  But as 
between players, one player’s theft of another’s property may well 
exceed the scope of consent and thus be actionable in fraud or 
conversion. 
Some thought experiments may help to cement this distinction.  
If person A threatens person B in the real world, that action is subject 
to the sanction of law.52  But what happens if A attacks or threatens 
B’s virtual avatar?  The old conception of the magic circle would 
dictate that an attack on an avatar is not actionable under real-world 
law.  However, varying the hypothetical slightly demonstrates that it 
does not matter whether an action is in-world or outside-world, but 
rather whether the A’s action is outside of B’s scope of consent.  If A 
takes an in-world action that is outside the scope of consent—for 
instance, if A threatens B’s avatar in a way that makes B feel 
personally threatened—then A’s in-world action will be subject to real-
world civil and criminal sanction.53 
A critic may respond that such an action is, in essence, a real-
world action since A’s threat was directed at B, a real person.  While 
true, this demonstrates that the sharp distinction between real and 
virtual worlds has already begun to blur: real people can still harm 
one another through actions outside of consent through the medium of 
a computer.  A further example blurs that barrier into non-existence.  
In some games, player-versus-player combat is a feature of the game.  
In such a game, if player A pulls out a virtual knife and stabs B’s 
avatar, the action is utterly pedestrian and non-actionable.  However, 
suppose instead that A attacks B’s avatar by hacking B’s account and 
deleting B’s avatar.  This form of attack subjects A to criminal 
penalties.54  The difference is that both players have consented to 
player-vs.-player combat as part of playing the game.  Hacking, 
however, is not part of the game, and thus the action is measured by 
background, default, real-world law.  In each case, the action is virtual 
and the object is virtual, but hacking falls outside the scope of consent 
 52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21-34 (1965). 
 53. The law makes no distinction between the method of communication, only that 
A threatened B and that B felt threatened. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-308(a) 
(2009) (allowing a cause of action for threats made via telephone). 
 54. See Musgrove, supra note 3. 
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and is subject to real-world legal sanction, whereas player-vs.-player 
combat is part of the game.55 
Consider the example of the Dutch boys that began this 
Article.56  They were convicted of theft of virtual property.57  It is 
irrelevant whether the theft of virtual property was accomplished by a 
real world action or a virtual-world action.  Certainly the out-of-game 
nature of the physical confrontation between the boys underscored the 
fact that the theft was outside the scope of any possible consent 
granted by the victim.  But it is not hard to construct a 
counterexample in which a physical confrontation that is within the 
rules of a game would not be actionable.  So-called “alternative reality 
games” intentionally cross the boundary between virtual and real 
environments.  Many alternative reality games include a significant 
component of physical confrontation—nothing on the order of pulling a 
knife, but there is an undeniable physical component.  So it is not the 
nature of a game as “real” or “virtual” that determines whether or not 
violation of the rules yields legal liability—again, it is whether the 
action of the player exceeds the scope of consent granted by the other 
players. 
Law in virtual worlds hinges in large part on the consent of 
players in the “real” world.  Virtual-world law has been dominated by 
industry-drafted EULAs58 and, as such, the concept of players 
determining law is a bit of a novel concept.  This should not be the 
case: EULAs derive what authority they have directly from the 
agreement of the players to their terms.59  This is hardly rocket 
science, but remembering the role of consent in games vastly 
simplifies the legal issues affecting virtual worlds.  Note too that the 
opinion of the community also matters.  Norms within virtual worlds 
are not usually negotiated on a person-to-person basis (though 
 55. Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, for example, such an action would 
likely be deemed an intent to defraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
 56. See Carver, supra note 1. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 
WL 2757357, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008) (“Use of [World of Warcraft] is governed by [a 
EULA] . . . and [a] Terms of Use Agreement.”); Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. 
Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding the relevant agreement provisions controlling, but 
unconscionable); see also Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual 
Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 429 (2008). 
 59. As the EULA is a contract, it requires the same basic elements taught in any 
first year contracts class: offer, acceptance, and consideration. It only gains power and 
enforceability when the user accepts and consents to its provisions. See, e.g., ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Following the district court, we treat the 
licenses as ordinary contracts accompanying the sale of products, and therefore as 
governed by the common law of contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code.”). 
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exceptions to the norms are typically negotiated individually).  
Instead, the judgment of the community sets the baseline.  For 
example, if a group decides to play tackle football, then each 
individual player has presumably consented to being tackled.  
Individual negotiations (“no hitting in the face!”) then occur in the 
shadow of that community norm.  If players can give consent, they can 
then modify that consent on a case-by-case basis.  If player A begins a 
sexually explicit conversation with player B in a club in Second Life, 
player A may soon find that the conversation crosses his boundaries.  
He can withdraw his consent to further conversation, even though he 
consented to—and even initiated—the original conversation. 
There are limits to this consent-based approach.  For example, 
it is important to ask whether one can consent to a certain activity at 
all.  For example, many virtual worlds are highly sexualized and there 
is a culture among gamers that can make female players deeply 
uncomfortable.60  Although it is possible to say that the community 
norm is to overtly sexualize women, it is impossible to argue that 
female players have consented to sexualized treatment merely by 
entering the world.  In this case, a more important real-world norm 
may well trump the in-world community norm. 
This interaction between community expectations and 
individual consent generates a large number of real-world legal rules 
that have true force and effect in online spaces.  The scope of consent 
defines the relationship between the laws of the real world and actions 
in virtual worlds and, therefore, any conception of the magic circle 
that excludes real-world law from virtual worlds does not seem 
accurate.  A new conception of the magic circle, which permits players 
and game gods to define the terms by which law enters virtual worlds, 
would be more accurate and useful. 
B. A Case Study: Money and the Magic Circle 
The interaction between money and the magic circle deserves 
special mention, since it is the intrusion of real-world dollars into 
virtual worlds that precipitated the current spate of virtual-world 
litigation.  Game gods use the metaphor of the magic circle to justify 
blocking real dollars from entering virtual worlds, in order to protect 
 60. See generally Mitch Wagner, Sex in Second Life, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 26, 
2007, available at http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/hosted/showArticle 
.jhtml?articleID=199701944 (describing the rise and prevalence of sexualized behavior in 
Second Life). 
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play and preserve the level playing field.61  Yet even a brief 
examination of the consent principle shows that this traditional 
understanding is erroneous.  Many virtual worlds, both those that are 
games and those that are not, operate using microtransactions.62  To 
obtain goods or services within the virtual world, one must pay with 
real-world cash.  Further, economics plays a direct role in computer 
hardware, which has a direct impact on the game experience.  It 
seems odd that the magic circle would block software upgrades by 
blocking the purchase of virtual property or game accounts for cash, 
but not block upgrading ones computer to get a significant advantage. 
The question is not whether real-world economics can or should 
impact virtual worlds; they can and they should.  The question is how 
much of an impact the players can expect.  Is buying a high-quality 
tennis racket considered unfair in tennis?  Do the New York Yankees 
cheat the League by having a player payroll nearly five times that of 
the current American League champions, the Tampa Bay Rays?63  
Typically, these questions are decided by their respective 
communities.  I would say that high-end hardware and fast internet 
connections are considered completely fair by the gaming community, 
despite the serious advantage that such technology gives to the 
owners who are willing to invest in it, whereas purchasing a magic 
sword or an upgraded account is subject to serious debate. 
Here, I should expose my personal bias.  I believe that the basic 
exchange of money for time is a bedrock facet of real-world culture.  
No one complains that I did not build my house for myself.  No one 
complains that I did not assemble my truck by hand.  No one even 
complains when I buy a precision-tooled set of golf clubs.  And yet 
there is a complaint when I ask someone else to create an avatar or an 
account in a virtual world to my specifications.  I think we should 
question that disparity.  It would be considered very strange in our 
capitalist society to eliminate our ability to trade money for what we 
 61. See MDY Indus., LLC. 2008 WL 2757357, at *1 (“Blizzard claims that Glider 
upsets this balance by enabling some payers to advance more quickly and unfairly, 
diminishing the game experience for other players. Blizzard also contends that Glider 
enables its users to acquire an inordinate number of game assets—sometimes referred to 
as ‘mining’ or ‘farming’ the game—with some users even selling those assets for real money 
in online auction sites, an activity expressly prohibited by the [terms of use].”) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 62. See Eric A. Taub, HDTV Is a New Reality for Game Developers, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 16, 2005, at C12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/16/business 
/16game.html (“Microsoft hopes to earn additional revenue through an increase in 
microtransactions, as players purchase game elements such as weapons and tattoos for a 
few cents each.”) 
 63. See CBS Sports, MLB Salaries, available at: http://www.cbssports.com 
/mlb/salaries. 
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want.  Accordingly, the idea that virtual worlds can survive only by 
wiping out both private property and the exchange of money for other 
people’s time seems suspect. 
The argument that play cannot survive the intrusion of real-
world economics does not appear entirely accurate.  Instead, the best 
that one can say is that the norm within some communities is to 
accept upgrades to both hardware and software; and the norm of other 
virtual worlds is to permit hardware upgrades but not software 
upgrades.  That is, it is the expectations of the players—either the 
imported expectations of a capitalist society or the nascent 
expectations of game players themselves—that determine whether or 
not private property exists within virtual worlds. 
Indeed, it is difficult to overestimate the impact of player 
expectations on the legal treatment of virtual property.  Regardless of 
EULA provisions, courts worldwide have chosen to treat virtual 
objects as personal property for the purposes of resolving criminal 
complaints brought by one player against another.64  Again, the 
example of the Dutch boys is instructive.  The Runescape EULA 
indicates quite clearly that players do not own the virtual objects they 
earn through game play.65  If one were to take the EULA as the sole 
source of operative law, then the perpetrators would have taken 
nothing from the victim.  Yet the Dutch court—as is typical of courts 
worldwide—chose not take that approach.66  This is also the approach 
taken by South Korea, which has codified a similarly complex set of 
expectations in statutory form.  Under South Korean law, virtual 
property may not be bought or sold commercially, but it may be 
exchanged between non-merchant individuals for in-world trade or 
currency.67  Additionally, theft of virtual property is a criminal offense. 
This Article does not advocate any particular solution to the 
problem of the interaction of real-world economics with virtual worlds.  
I use it here to make two points: first, that it is impossible to separate 
virtual worlds from the economics of the real world; second, that 
 64. See, e.g., Will Knight, Gamer Wins Back Virtual Booty in Court Battle, NEW 
SCIENTIST, Dec. 23, 2003, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4510-gamer-wins-back-
virtual-booty-in-court-battle.html (discussing a Chinese case where the court ordered the 
Internet service provider to replace virtual items that had been hacked and stolen). 
 65. RuneScape Terms and Conditions, http://www.runescape.com/terms/terms.ws 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2009) (“You agree that all intellectual property or other rights in any 
game character, account, and items are and will remain our property.”). 
 66. See supra note 1. 
 67. Korea’s “Act of the Promotion of Game Business,” Chapter 2, 32-(1)-7, forbids 
commercial trading of virtual items, yet recognizes the private fun of individual trades if 
not done commercially. 
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consumer expectations can be a powerful source of law for virtual 
worlds. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Several points are worthy of reemphasis.  The individuals who 
enter virtual worlds are real, their actions within those worlds are 
real, and the effects of those actions on other people are real.  Thus, it 
is implausible to say that virtual worlds are not subject to real-world 
law, since real consent given by real people is the very source of law in 
virtual worlds. 
It is likely that courts will increasingly look to standards 
developed by virtual communities and that those community 
standards will come to have the same force and effect as real-world 
industry customs in creating real-world law.  The first steps have 
already been taken: courts have not been shy about applying basic 
contract and tort law to virtual worlds.68  As the real-dollar value of 
virtual-world assets grows, courts will not hesitate to apply real-world 
criminal law to virtual worlds. 
The implications for the future of virtual worlds are complex.  
On one hand, denizens of virtual worlds should hope that the law that 
ultimately governs virtual worlds will not only take their interests 
into account in a paternalistic fashion, but also that courts will give 
the actual solutions worked out by online communities the force of 
law.  On the other hand, players in virtual worlds should understand 
that their behavior online is not entirely free from real-world scrutiny.  
This is a bit saddening.  It was wonderful to live in the cyber Wild 
West.  However, every new frontier has its civilizing moments.  And 
virtual worlds are an enormous phenomenon that the law cannot 
afford to ignore. 
 
 68. See supra note 58. 
